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1. INTRODUCTION 
This conference series has been somewhat dominated by papers on experience from the 
UK.  The first conference in Thredbo in May 1989 featured a large number of papers on 
the early experience of bus deregulation in Britain which occurred in October 1986. 
Papers that come to mind include general reviews by Beesley and by White and Turner 
and  case studies by Hills (on Scotland) and by Donald and Pickup (on Merseyside). 
More theoretical papers were provided by Dodgson and Katsoulacos, by Evans and by 
Preston (all dated  1989).  The debate continued in Tampere (see for example White, 
1991, Blundred, 1991) but had petered out by the Toronto conference (other than papers 
on bus tendering by Newton, 1993, and White and Tough, 1993). However, you can’t 
keep a good man down.  1992 saw the publication of the railway privatisation White 
Paper New Opportunities for Railways and the inevitable paper at Toronto (Nash and 
Preston, 1993).  As rail privatisation proceeded, the papers followed at both the Rotorua 
(Nash, 1995) and Leeds (Nash, 1997) conferences. 
In this paper I will try and draw some lessons for other countries from the experiences in 
the United Kingdom. In so doing, I will try and update the story in The Local Bus Market 
(Mackie and Preston, 1996) and Changing Trains (Van de Velde, 1999, with a chapter on 
Great Britain by Root and Preston).  I should start off with two obvious but important 
caveats.  First, countries are different.  In the project that led to the book Changing 
Trains, we tried to look at countries (or parts of countries) which were similar to The 
Netherlands.  We concluded that there were no countries in the world similar to The 
Netherlands.  We could equally have concluded that there are no countries similar to 
Great Britain.   We could draw the same conclusion for South Africa, perhaps more so 
given both its Dutch and British influences. Secondly, what I am going to present is a 
personal, subjective view - some of which is backed up by empirical evidence (but some 
isn’t). 
What I want to do then is draw, somewhat randomly, 20 lessons from the experiences of 
reforming bus services in the 1980s and 20 lessons from  the reform of  passenger 
railways in Great Britain in the 1990s.  These will be outlined in sections 2 and 3 
respectively.  Section 4 will speculate on the future of public transport, whilst section 5 
will draw some broad conclusions. 
2. EXPERIENCE FROM THE BUS REFORMS
1. There are regulatory (and ownership) cycles. This concept was propounded by 
Needham (1983) and is illustrated for the bus industry by Figure 1 (the Swiss Roll 
diagram).  Following rapid growth in the 1920s the bus industry was regulated by the 
21930 Road Traffic Act.  Price regulation was lifted by the 1980 Transport Act and 
quantity regulation by the 1985 Transport Act.  Concerns that this has re-introduced 
some aspects of market failure may lead to a 2000 Transport Act (although this is by 
no means guaranteed) in which some regulatory powers are increased.  The bus 
industry’s initial growth phase was dominated by private sector operators.  A 
watershed was the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act which created a publicly 
owned board to own all Underground railways and buses operating in London.  
Public ownership was extended by the 1947 and 1968 Transport Acts.  By 1985/6, 
91% of local bus kms were operated by public sector companies.  The 1985 Transport 
Act changed all that.  By 1996/7 this figure was down to 4% (DETR, 1997). It is to be 
hoped that this process is a virtuous circle that will lead ultimately to an economically 
efficient and equitable industry. In reality, this outcome is likely to be more of a 
moving target which at different times may be best achieved by publicly owned and 
regulated and or by privately owned and deregulated systems, reflecting the varying 
importance over time of regulatory and market failures.   
1. Deregulation does not seem to have halted the decline in demand. The aggregate 
statistics suggest that the local bus industry is in terminal decline.  Table 1 shows that, 
between 1950 and 1996/7, the number of passenger journeys by local bus declined by 
65% (or 2.2% compound per annum).  The greatest rate of decline was in the 1960s 
and 1970s (over 3% per annum) but the rate of decline has been over 2% per  annum 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  Since 1985/6, patronage outside London has declined by  
32%  (or 3.2% per annum compound) (see Table 2), although there is some evidence 
to suggest that this decline is now slowing down.  In London, where comprehensive 
tendering was gradually introduced between 1985 and 1994, patronage has increased 
since 1985/6 by 12%. However, this increase also coincided with the take-off of the 
Travelcard concept, which was introduced in London relatively late (1983).  London 
Transport (1993) estimated that the Travelcard boosted bus passenger km by 20% and 
bus revenue by 4%.  The strong demand performance in London is thus unlikely to be 
due to competitive tendering alone.  It should also be noted that the London economy 
has been relatively buoyant in the period under study.  NERA (1997) note that, in 
London, population increased by 3.5% between 1985 and 1995 and that car 
ownership per capita was falling in the 1990s.  In Northern Ireland public transport 
has remained publicly owned and regulated, although latterly the two main bus 
companies and the rail system have been integrated under the Translink banner 
(established in 1995).  White (1995) reports that between 1985/6 and 1993/4, bus 
passenger trips in Northern Ireland declined by only 7%, compared to a 27% decline 
in Great Britain outside London.  It is not, though, sensible to draw lessons from 
Northern Ireland because of its unique political and economic environment.  In the 
rest of this paper, we will focus solely on Great Britain. 
2. Deregulation seems to have halted the decline in supply. Local bus vehicle kms have 
declined by  21% (or 0.5% per annum) between 1950 and 1996/7 (Table 1). By 
contrast,  since 1985/6 vehicle kms outside London have increased by 36%. In 
London, bus kms have increased by 33% (Table 2). 
3. Deregulation does not seem to have led to lower fares. Real fares outside London 
have increased by 27% since 1985/6. Some of this increase was due to initial large 
fare rises in metropolitan areas such as Liverpool and Sheffield previously well 
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years since 1985/6. 
4. Deregulation is associated with lower subsidies. Subsidies (revenue support and 
concessionary fares) have decreased by 41% outside London since 1985/6. Glaister 
(1993) argued that this was the main aim of the deregulation package. In London 
subsidy has decreased by 68%. 
5. Deregulation has led to large reductions in costs.  The cost per bus km, including 
depreciation, has decreased by 47%, whilst the cost per passenger journey has 
decreased by only 3% outside London since 1985/6. In London, bus operating costs 
have decreased by 46% since 1985/6 if measured per bus km and by 33% if measured 
per passenger journey. The reductions in units costs per km seem to have come fairly 
evenly from three main sources: reduced factor prices (particularly labour but also 
fuel), reduced use of factors (again particularly labour but also land) and improved 
production processes (partly associated with the deployment of more appropriately 
sized vehicles).  Since 1984, employment in the bus and coach industries has declined 
by 20%.  An unanswered question is what happened to the 36,000 workers who were 
shed by the industry?  Another important trend has been that of plant rationalisation.  
Take as an example the city of Leeds. In the early 1980s the city (with a population of  
around 500,000) was served by three bus stations, six depots and  one workshop. 
Today, the city is served by three depots (one of which also doubles up as the 
workshop) and one bus station. 
6. Bus deregulation has led to some problems concerning service quality. Problems 
have been identified with service reliability and stability, information availability, age 
of vehicles, timetable co-ordination and fares integration (Mackie, Preston and Nash, 
1995, White, 1997). Concerns about safety, congestion and adverse environmental 
effects have largely been unfounded. 
7. Deregulation has led to a patronage puzzle.  Assuming that bus fare elasticities are 
on average -0.4 and service elasticities are 0.4, we would forecast a 3% increase in 
bus patronage outside London between 1985/6 and 1997/8. The out-turn was a 32% 
decrease leaving a patronage gap of minus 35% or a secular decline of 3.5% per 
annum.  Making the same assumptions for London we would forecast a decline in bus 
patronage of  1% when in fact demand increased by 12%, resulting in a patronage gap 
of plus 13% (or a secular increase of 1.0% per annum).  Much of the gap in London 
might be accounted for by the take-off of the travelcard concept. Outside London the 
explanation might be related to the perceived deterioration in service quality. 
8. Deregulation led to a mixed pattern of gains and losses.  Table 3 shows that outside 
London, the main gainers from deregulation have been producers who have been able 
to reduce costs substantially, although much of these savings have been spent on 
unproductive service or taken away in terms of reduced subsidy.  As a result, the 
other main gainer has been Government and it should be noted here that we have not 
included the shadow price of public funds. It may be argued that the gains to 
Government (and ultimately society) should be increased by around 20% as a result 
of the removal of this excess burden (see Dodgson and Topham, 1987).  The main 
losers from deregulation have been consumers who have disbenefited from higher 
fares and lower quality of service.  This can be measured by an inward shift of the 
4demand curve although this could be due to other factors e.g. increased competition 
from car due to lowering motoring costs and changes in land use to favour car borne 
journeys.  The other main losers of deregulation have been other sectors of the 
economy,  most notably bus workers who have had a modest decline in their real 
wages but a large erosion of their differential with respect to other manual workers.  
In addition, oil  producers lost revenue due to falling prices.  This may have been 
offset by falls in production costs and anyway was reversed in the period 1995 to 
1997 when fuel prices increased by around 60%, although this was largely due to 
reductions in fuel tax rebate. 
9. Deregulation and subsidy reductions led to welfare losses. It is estimated from Table 
3 that outside London, the full deregulation package led to a £100m loss of welfare 
between the years 1985/6 and 1993/4. This represented an improvement on the 
estimated loss of £166m in 1987/8 suggesting that some of the welfare loss may have 
been due to transitional disequilibrium.  However, it might be argued that subsidy 
reductions should be considered separately from the deregulation package.  If this is 
done, the economic model used suggests that deregulation on its own has had a 
positive welfare effect, increasing welfare by £144m between 1985/6 and 1993/4.  
Welfare increased by only £7m between 1985/6 and 1987/8 which again is evidence  
of some transitional costs. 
10. Comprehensive tendering led to a different pattern of gains and losses. In London, 
the producer surplus change has been slightly negative.  Other sectors of the economy 
have also seen small negative changes.  Offset against this have been large positive 
changes to Government, as a result of reduced subsidy, and to consumers, as a result 
of increased service levels and service quality and despite large increases in fares. 
There are, however, concerns that aggregate statistics have exaggerated the true level 
of fare increases due to a failure to take into account the greater use of discounted 
tickets. 
11. Comprehensive tendering led to welfare gains. In London, welfare has increased by 
£205m between the years 1985/6 and 1993/4, with this increase particularly marked 
since 1987/8 due to the acceleration of the tendering procedure and the (then) 
imminent privatisation of London Buses.  What is also noticeable is that although the 
changes in total surplus are relatively modest outside London (at most 5 or 6%), in 
London they are much more significant (up to 27%). It should be noted that this 
analysis may underestimate administrations costs.  Glaister (1997) estimates that on a 
like for like basis tendering in London in 1992 (when only about 40% of the network 
was tendered) led to a 20% cost saving (around £180m) but this reduced to 16% when 
administration costs were taken into account. The administrative costs of tendering 
were running at £36m per annum and this does not include one-off payments related 
to redundancies etc.  A key issue is can these costs be reduced? 
12. There are more than three policy options. The above analysis might suggest that, in 
welfare terms and on a like for like basis, comprehensive tendering (limited 
competition) is more efficient than deregulation (full competition) which in turn is 
more efficient than regulation (no competition).  This is the policy menu  offered by 
the European Commission’s Green Paper “The Citizens’ Network” (COM(95) 601, 
1995).  In fact, the number of dishes on the regulatory menu is far more numerous 
than three.  In another paper (Preston, 1997), we show that there can be several 
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various forms of residual regulation and a huge range of tendering/franchising 
options.  In practice, the last set of options can be reduced to three main types: net 
subsidy contracts at a route level (the Scandinavian model), management contracts or 
franchises at an area level (the French model) and hybrid contracts, personified by 
cities such as  Adelaide (Australia) and  Helsingborg (Sweden) (ISOTOPE, 1996).   
13. Deregulation has had some successes at the route level.  Improved marketing has led 
to growth in demand on some routes.  Trent’s Rainbow services have grown the 
market by 5% in the Derby-Nottingham area, with Transport 2000 reporting demand 
on ‘the Spondon Flyer’ up  70% (Transport 2000, 1997).  Similarly, improved 
marketing of Stagecoach’s Burnley to Manchester service led to a 9% increase in 
market volume (Colson, 1997). New inter-urban services have been developed, for 
example, by Stagecoach, particularly in Scotland and Yorkshire and Humberside. 
Express links to airports have proliferated and 24 hour services have been reinstated 
in some urban areas. Other important examples are the guided bus experiments in 
Ipswich and Leeds.  Tebb (1997) reports 42% traffic growth on the former after 16 
months and 30% on the latter after 12 months.  There is some interesting evidence on 
the performance of the all day Leith and peak hour Corstophine Greenways (bus 
priority routes) in Edinburgh.  These schemes have led to 25% and 10% reductions in 
bus journey times respectively, with an additional 250,000 passengers  travelling on 
Lothian Region Transport buses on these routes (DETRa, 1998, p42).  
14. Deregulation has had successes at the network level.  There has also been patronage 
growth at the network level.  An example is Preston, Lancashire, where intense 
competition led to a doubling of bus miles and a short-term 10% increase in demand 
(Mackie and Preston, 1988).  The dominant operator reports that much of this 
additional demand has been maintained despite subsequent reductions in mileage by 
the entrant.  Similar trends might be expected in other towns with similar competitive 
histories such as Stockton and Lancaster (see Evans, 1990). The re-launch of  
Stagecoach’s subsidiary in Carlisle resulted in 4% passenger growth  (Colson, op 
cit.).  In Brighton, a package of measures, including increased frequencies on the core 
routes, simplified fares, better vehicles and a whole series of marketing initiatives  
has led to a 5% per annum patronage increase over four years  (Enoch, 1998).  The 
introduction of minibuses and other measures have led to a revival of some urban bus 
markets.  Commonly quoted successes include Bristol (demand up 20% plus) and 
Exeter (demand up  300% - Glaister, 1997).  Park and ride has been credited as 
having a similar effect in Oxford, where demand is reported to have increased by 
between 35 and 70% (Enoch, op cit.). 
15. Deregulation has also had its failures.  The corollary of the above is that if there have 
been many instances of demand being significantly above the mean downward trend, 
there must be instances where demand is significantly lower than the mean decline. 
The latest available statistics suggests that the biggest decreases in demand have been 
in the Metropolitan areas (i.e. the big cities outside of London), with the exception of 
the West Midlands, and hence in Northern Britain (Scotland and the three 
northernmost regions in England).  Further explanations should be sought to explain, 
using Enoch’s (1997) phrase, “the mess and the success of deregulation.”  Enoch cites 
Darlington as a classic example of a deregulation failure. 
616. Competition has had important effects on route and network structure.  Competition 
when it occurs seems to be in the service quantity dimension leading to a higher 
fares/higher frequency outcomes in the manner forecast by Evans (1987). There has 
been little competition in terms of price or service quality, despite the forecasts of 
Dodgson and Katsoulacos (1988), although Magicbus type services in cities such as 
Manchester are an important exception. In the longer term, a sustainable route 
structure, at least for the most heavily trafficked routes, seems to consist of  a large 
proportion of service being provided by the dominant operator,  but with a significant 
proportion being provided by a smaller operator.  The latter may be free-riding on the 
former’s timetable (James, 1996).  There has been less work on the network 
implications but here are a few observations.  One form of entry deterrence has been 
gap filling, in which the incumbent maximises the geographic coverage of the 
network.  The result is a complex, dense route network but with relatively low 
frequencies – the bowl of spaghetti network.  West Yorkshire provides some good 
examples of this but it is probably the dominant network pattern throughout the 
country.  One exception is where there is prolonged intense competition between two, 
evenly matched combatants. Services concentrate on the main radials and a hub and 
spoke network emerges or is re-inforced.  Oxford is probably the best example of 
this, with local services feeding into long distance services to London and its airports.  
Another exception occurs where entry is forestalled by market dominance.  A case in 
point may be Brighton where the merger of the two main companies has led to a 
simplified network, at least in terms of representation, with the use of London 
Underground style maps. 
17. Privatisation has had important effects. Bus deregulation has been accompanied by 
privatisation. The 70 National Bus Company subsidiaries were sold between 1986 
and 1988, the 9 Scottish Bus Group subsidiaries were sold in 1990/91 and the 11 
London Buses subsidiaries were sold in 1994.  Unlike rail, the receipts from these 
sales have been relatively modest (over £650m).  Ownership changes seem to have 
been particularly important in prolonging the period of cost reductions, particularly in 
London where cost reductions were given added impetus in the early 1990s as a result 
of impending privatisation.  Ownership does seem to matter, contrary to earlier 
studies (for example, Millward, 1982), although we  would concede that competition 
is probably more important. 
18. Re-agglomeration occurred relatively quickly. Between 1988 and 1997, TAS (1997) 
recorded 185 principal takeovers in the bus industry.  A big three has emerged in the 
bus industry (Arriva, First Group and Stagecoach) who controlled 11% of the 
industry’s turnover in 1989 but by 1997 controlled 53%. The latest (as yet 
unpublished) analysis by TAS indicates that operating margins in the industry 
average 12%, with 21% of companies having margins of over 15% and 22% having 
margins of less than 5%.  The question must be asked: has re-agglomeration led to 
monopoly rents (for some)? These mergers and allegations of predatory behaviour by 
dominant operators have attracted the attention of the pro-competition authorities (the 
Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission), with over 30 
investigations of the bus industry since 1989.  However, the power of these residual 
regulatory authorities has been weak although this has changed as a result of the 1998 
Competition Act with its stop and search powers and fines of up to 10% of annual 
turnover.  
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was assisted by the existence of competitive private hire and excursions and tours bus 
industries and since 1980 a competitive express coach industry. The 1980 reforms 
had also highlighted the need to ensure access to essential facilities such as terminals.  
Reforms in the bus industry, where 70% of costs are labour related, were assisted by 
the deregulation of labour markets throughout the 1980s.  Another important point to 
make is the inter-relationship between the commercial and tendered markets outside 
London.  Although the tendered market only makes up around 15% of bus miles, up 
to 80% of routes may have a tendered element.  Tendering has been particularly 
important in allowing small entrants to get a foothold in the market and in driving 
costs down (possibly too far).  We have argued elsewhere that, with low entry costs 
and long reaction periods, the tendered market is more contestable than the 
commercial market (although this assumes exit costs are also low) (Preston, 1991).  
The resultant hybrid market is more contestable than a purely commercial market 
would be. 
3. EXPERIENCE FROM THE RAIL REFORMS 
1. The railway reform process is only at the half way stage.  The bus reforms discussed 
above have been in existence for over 10 years and it is not clear that an equilibrium 
has yet been reached.  The reforms of the railways in Great Britain are more recent, 
legislated for by the 1993 Railways Act.  The state owned British Railways was 
restructured into one track authority (Railtrack), three rolling stock leasing companies 
(ROSCOs), 25 passenger train operating companies (TOCs), seven freight train 
operating units and some 70 ancillary businesses beginning to trade as free standing 
units on 1 April 1994.  The first private passenger TOCs began operating in February 
1996, with the franchising completed by March 1997.  Railtrack was privatised 
through a stock market flotation in the spring of 1996.  However, the TOCs have long 
leases with the ROSCOs which do not come up for renewal until around 2003.  
Similarly, Railtrack has long term contracts with the Infrastructure Supply Companies 
(ISCOs) that will be renewed around 2003.  2003 is also the year in which the first 
tranche of franchises will come up for renewal. 
2. On-the- track competition has been limited, but has been important where permitted.
Up until September 1999, competition was limited to services that competed prior to 
the reforms and services that constitute less than 0.2% of a TOCs revenue.  In 
September 1999, these limits will be increased to 20%, whilst it is still provisionally 
planned to introduce full open access competition in 2002.  Nonetheless, there has 
been some significant competition, most notably between Virgin West Coast and 
Chiltern between London and Birmingham; National Express’s Gatwick Express, 
Connex South Central and GOVIA’s Thameslink services between London and 
Gatwick; and GNER and WAGN between London and Peterborough.  These 
competitive battles have involved product differentiation, service frequency increases 
and selective fares cuts.  
3. Substantial on-the-track competition is feasible but is unlikely to be desirable. Our 
simulation work suggests that frequency enhancements in the peak are likely to be the 
most common competitive outcome (Preston et al., 1999).  This outcome is referred 
to as cream skimming (also know as cherry picking).  Although passengers benefit, 
operators lose out essentially as a result of providing too much service at too high a 
8price - a classic outcome of oligopolistic competition, which has also been observed 
in the bus industry.  The ability to price discriminate may also be much reduced.  
Overall, economic welfare reduces unless (i) competition stimulates productive 
efficiency gains (ii) competition stimulates dynamic efficiency through improved 
productivity.  It is possible that some forms of competition, particularly involving 
product differentiation, can lead to these two types of  efficiency gain. 
4. Off-the-track competition was substantial.  In the first round, there was an average of 
5 serious bids for each of the 25 TOCs, even with the constraint that the publicly 
owned incumbent can only be a bidder of last resort. A key issue is whether this level 
of competitive activity may be maintained in the second round in 2003. 
5. Off-the-track competition intensified in later tranches.  The subsidy required for a 
franchise was £18m p.a. lower in the 10
th
 tranche than in the first tranche.  This 
represented a 27% subsidy reduction or put another way a 27% increase in the bid 
price.  The converse of this is that companies that got in first (Stagecoach, GNER, 
First Great Western) are making substantial profits. There are parallels with the 
privatisation of the National Bus Company where the first subsidiaries to be sold 
were so at a price favourable to the purchaser. The policy of having a series of 
franchise tranches was vindicated in that reasonable prices were eventually achieved. 
A challenge for the future may be  to avoid the bunching of renewals at seven year 
intervals and have a more regular spread of contract renewals. 
6. Off-the-track competition was dependent on the liberalised bus and coach markets.
Fifteen out of the 25 TOCs went to bus companies (who have subsequently gained 3 
more).  Each franchise had at least 2 bids from bus companies. 
7. Management Buy Outs (MBOs) were relatively unsuccessful. They only won four 
franchises.  All have subsequently been sold on suggesting that, in the British context 
at least, MBOs are an ephemeral organisational form. This phenomenon has also been 
observed in the bus industry (see, for example, Wright et al., 1992).  
8. Agglomeration occurred almost straight away.  Four groupings (National Express 
Group, Connex, Stagecoach/Virgin Trains and First Group) control 70% of revenue.  
Does this mean that British Rail was split into too many passenger train operating 
units?  Not necessarily so.  One lesson might be that if you are to horizontally 
separate a business it may be sensible to err on the side of too many, small units.  The 
market can then put the units back together in the most optimal manner.  The parallels 
with the bus industry should be obvious. 
9. Off-track competition appears to be effective in that subsidy is forecast to reduce 
substantially.  Total subsidy is forecast to reduce from around £1.9b in the first year 
of franchising to £0.5b in the final year of the first round.  However, we estimate that 
in 1998/99 the industry was off target by around £100m. Currently, two TOCs are 
operating without profit. Eventually 10 TOCs are forecast to do so, most 
spectacularly Virgin West Coast. 
10. The financial picture is difficult to assess. In 1993/4 (the last financial year before the 
reforms) the passenger TOCs received £0.55b in direct revenue subsidy (from the 
British Railways Board Annual Report and Accounts, 1993/4) but  there were also : 
9x Additional subsidies related to capital grants and grants towards the operation and 
maintenance of  level crossings which could amount to as much as £0.54b per 
annum. 
x Change in accounting conventions from current replacement cost of renewed 
assets to modern equivalent asset valuation of all assets increased the railways 
capital costs by 25%. This too may  represent around £0.54b per annum. 
x If the receipts of the privatisation sales are amortised over, say, a 30 year period 
they represent a substantial sum (around £0.3b per annum).   
These points explain most of the difference between the pre and post privatisation 
subsidy levels, although it should be no surprise that different authors draw different 
conclusions.  Harris and Godward, 1997, conclude that privatisation  has led to a 
worsening of the railway’s financial situation, White (1998) concludes the opposite.  
An unresolved issue is the size of the transitional costs. 
11. A commercial open access network with a complementary social network may 
emerge.  The chief architect of the railways reforms, Sir Christopher Foster, saw a 
two tier railway network emerging (Foster, 1994). We seem to be on target for this 
occurring in 2003.  The passenger rail industry will then be structured in a similar 
manner to the local bus and coach industry, but with much greater fare regulation. 
12. Franchises could have been better specified.  Modelling work we have undertaken 
suggests that 12 years loosely regulated franchises could have reduced the subsidy 
bill by 20%.  Removing exclusivity (i.e. protection from open access) is forecast to  
increase the subsidy bill by 10% (Whelan et al., 1998). Some TOCs run services in 
areas where a Passenger Transport Authority takes the revenue risk and in areas 
where the train operating company itself takes the risk.  In all cases, revenue growth 
has been substantially higher in the latter cases.  There has been a renewed interest in 
micro-franchises, particularly for rural branch lines.  It is possible that a second round 
of franchises may involve the subcontracting of such lines.  
13. One of the aims of the privatisation was to raise money for the Exchequer.  The
reforms were successful in this, raising £4.4b in revenue. Rail privatisation was the 
biggest of the UK transport privatisations.  With a certain amount of ingenuity, the 
railway business can be re-structured so as to have profitable elements. 
14. The creation of the ROSCOs removed an important barrier to entry.  Due to the 
creation of the three ROSCOs, access to rolling stock has not been a major problem. 
According to the TOCs, the main problems with ROSCOs revolve around the high 
charges, the reluctance to provide new rolling stock and poor performance with 
respect to maintenance etc. The lack of incentivisation may have been an oversight as 
may the lack of claw-back provisions.  The ROSCOs were initially sold for £1.7b, but 
were subsequently sold on for around £2.7b, leading to the National Audit Office 
concluding that this represented poor value for the taxpayer (NAO, 1998). 
15. The performance of Railtrack has been mixed.  I should state here, straightaway, that 
I am a vertical separation sceptic (see Preston, 1996).  My main concern, although not 
the only one, regards investment.  Railtrack as a private monopoly has strong 
incentives to increase prices and reduce output, and this has been reflected by its 
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reluctance to invest in the network.  The proposed solution is a new Railway Bill in 
which regulations will be tightened to specify investment levels as part of Railtrack’s 
operating license conditions and penalties will be increased. The problem is that this 
may just force up Railtrack’s price of capital and lead to less investment than would 
otherwise be the case.  We have at least avoided in Britain the alternative investment 
problem that might result from a vertically separated but publicly owned track 
authority, that of the gold plated railway.  Incentives appear to have worked well in 
encouraging Railtrack to improve its performance with respect to the operation of the 
network.  In addition, a profit sharing agreement has been established with Virgin 
with respect to the Passenger Upgrade II of the West Coast Main Line, but there are 
concerns that this investment incentive scheme may be anti-competitive.   
16. The headline statistics seem encouraging. One of the first casualties of a reform 
process is consistent statistics.  This has also been true of the bus industry. 
Nonetheless,  Table 5 shows that between 1993/4 and 1998/9, passenger kms went up 
by almost 16%.  Real receipts per passenger km went up by 9%, although we estimate 
that one third of this increase is due to a shortening of mean journey lengths. 
Improved revenue yield techniques may be responsible for much of the latter.  We 
estimate that train kms have increased by over 10% during this period.  This demand 
increase is in line with what one might expect using conventional elasticities,  
assuming no secular time trend.  There does not seem to be a patronage puzzle here. 
 (It should be clear that my comments on rail refer to the passenger industry.  Freight 
tonne kms have gone up by 22% between 1993/4 and 1997/8, despite continued 
restructuring of the UK economy.  Privatisation for the freight industry is much less 
problematic - not least because the freight market is more perfectly competitive.  This 
is not due to actual on-track competition (there is some but this is limited and 
declining) but due to inter-modal and end product market competition.  For general 
merchandise (e.g. through the Channel Tunnel), road is a fierce competitor.  For bulk 
goods, competition in the end-product market is fierce (e.g. UK power station coal 
replaced by foreign coal or by natural gas). 
17. Customer expectations concerning quality appear to have increased. There has been 
a lot of concern about punctuality (the percentage of trains x minutes late) and 
reliability (the percentage of trains operated).  The truth is that these are little 
changed.  Indeed, they are slightly improved, despite some recent deteriorations. The 
problem is that the public expected dramatic improvements.  Complaints to the 
Central Rail Users’ Consultative Committee have more than doubled and complaints 
to operators have exceeded 1m per annum (but there are also stronger reasons to 
complain because of improved compensation). 
18. There have been some important entrepreneurial initiatives. These are detailed in 
Van de Velde et al. (1998). The most important concern ticketing (particularly 
regarding group travel and bonus schemes) and distribution (especially telesales). 
Some have been stimulated by the Regulator (e.g. the National Rail Enquiry Service) 
and by OPRAF (Franchise Commitments).  The main initiatives in the future will be 
related to new rolling stock, and particularly tilting trains which will be introduced 
some 20 years after the abandonment of the APT project.   With new rolling stock, 
there is likely to be further increases in service levels.  Passenger dividends, insisted 
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on by OPRAF when TOCs change ownership, have emphasised new services (e.g. 
Oxford to Bristol) and bus-rail and bus-cycle integration. 
19. There have been substantial changes in staff levels and costs.  Rail staff numbers 
declined by 48% between 1994 and 1998 but some of this is due to the 
reclassification of staff from SIC 60.1.  Cost savings seem likely for the industry as a 
whole but may be easier for Railtrack and the ROSCOs to achieve than the TOCs.  
We estimate that over the last year, although the TOCs have exceeded their forecasts 
for revenue growth, costs have increased slightly when reductions were being sought. 
20. A complex regime has been made to work.  This has been a considerable achievement 
in itself.  However, further changes are planned.  The Strategic Railway Authority 
will combine the rail responsibilities of the Department of Transport and OPRAF.  
The main advantages are that passenger and freight planning will be more integrated 
and the objectives of the second round of franchising better articulated.  The main 
area of concern is the possible duplication, with the Rail Regulator, in controlling 
Railtrack and conflicts between value for money and promoting competition 
objectives. 
Could the regime have been made better?  This depends on the counterfactual.  It 
does appear that in financial and economic terms the new regime in 1999 is better 
than the old regime in 1994.  But would it be better than the old regime would have 
been in 1999?  I have my doubts, and my doubts revolve around Railtrack.  There 
may be a case for Railtrack being investigated by the Competition Commission.  If 
Railtrack is found to be acting anti-competitively, one option would be to split it up 
into its ten or so zones (akin to the AT&T baby bells) which to some extent map onto 
the TOCs.  A market test could then be established for vertical integration in the way 
that it has already been established for horizontal integration.  
4. THE FUTURE 
The reforms of the bus and rail industries were closely linked with the Conservative 
administrations of 1979 to 1997.  The election of the new Labour government in 1997 
may have represented a sea change in British politics but, at least initially, a much more 
modest change in transport policy. The integrated transport White Paper A New Deal for 
Transport: Better for Everyone published in 1998 had a clear antecedent in the previous 
administration’s Green Paper Transport: The Way Forward.  Both saw increased usage 
of public transport as part of the answer to the transport problem.  The new 
Government’s policies have been further articulated in daughter documents for rail and 
bus (DETR, 1998c, 1999c). 
However, the aggregate statistics suggest that the future of the bus may be bleak.  If the 
per annum decline in passenger kms observed so far in the 1990s (2.3% compound) is 
continued, by 2020 demand will be down by a further  40% to 24b passenger kms. For 
rail, the position is slightly less bleak.  Demand increased by 6% during the 1990s  (0.6% 
compound per annum).  Extrapolation of this trend would lead to 37b rail passenger kms 
by 2020. Using the mean National Road Traffic Forecast (1997) growth rate for all traffic 
(1.3% compound per annum), we might forecast  a 35% increase in car, van and taxi 
traffic to 837b passenger kms.  Table 6 suggests that in such a do nothing situation, 
public transport’s market share would decrease from 12% in 1996/7 to 8% in 2020.  This 
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assumes that demographics are neutral. Some have argued that the bus will face a 
demographic time bomb in the next few years due to reduced numbers of young adults 
and the recently retired (Hill et al., 1989).   However, the demographic trends are more 
favourable for rail. 
The disaggregate statistics may be less bleak.  The experience from London suggests a 
more favourable regulatory regime could result in stable, rather than declining bus 
demand, whilst the evidence from deregulatory successes suggests that demand increases 
of up to 40% may be possible as a result of internal factors. Such an increase would mean 
56b passenger kms carried by bus in 2020. External factors also need to be taken into 
account, in particular the 6% per annum increase in fuel duty and road user and parking 
charges.  Given a cross elasticity of  bus demand with respect to car out-of- pocket 
expenses  of 0.3 (Preston, 1999), and assuming that the only perceived out-of-pocket car 
expense is petrol  and  fuel duty is 68% of  petrol price (DETR, 1998b), we estimate that 
bus demand in 2020 will increase by 32% to 74b passenger kms as a result of the fuel 
duty escalator.  The impact of road user and parking charges is more difficult to estimate 
but suppose they lead to a doubling of out-of-pocket car expenses.  This would result in a 
further 23% increase in bus demand to 91b passenger kms, almost identical to the levels 
achieved in 1950.  Car, van and taxi use in 2020 might be forecast to fall by some 7% to 
781b passenger kms.  For rail, in this more optimistic do-something scenario, we might 
extrapolate the post 1994 trend, in which passenger kms have increased by 16% (2.9% 
compound). This would result in demand increasing to 62b passenger kms in  2020.  
Assuming rail has a similar cross elasticity with respect to car costs as bus, national rail 
demand might increase to 76b passenger kms as a result of the introduction of road user 
and parking charges.  We have assumed that local rail (predominantly London 
Underground) would follow similar trends to national rail.  As a result Table 6 suggests 
that, with radical policies enacted immediately, public transport’s market share could 
increase to 19%. This would still fall a far  way short of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution’s 2020 target of 30% of passenger kms being carried by public 
transport (bus and rail) (RCEP, 1994) and public transport’s market share of 60% in the 
early 1950s. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
In order for the spiral of decline in public transport usage to be reversed  in the manner 
outlined above, a further turn in the regulatory cycle is probably required.  The 1998 
White Paper is probably correct to place greatest emphasis for bus on quality 
partnerships, particularly if accompanied by light touch regulation in which the powers of 
the Traffic Commissioners are increased.  This is probably most appropriate in non 
Metropolitan areas where the successes of deregulation seem to be concentrated and 
where the institutional framework for increased regulation is lacking.  It may be less 
appropriate in the Metropolitan areas where free rider problems may be more intense, 
where network benefits of integrated ticketing and timetables may be greatest and where 
the PTAs/PTEs provide  an  institutional capability for increased regulation.  Here quality 
contracts might be more beneficial, although we have argued elsewhere (e.g. Preston, 
1997) that these should draw on the lessons from London with an emphasis on route 
based contracts based on full costs with revenue and performance incentives.  We also 
believe that some experimentation should be carried out in contracting out the network 
design function. We thus believe that proper regulation at the local level (an aspiration of 
the Labour government) might involve a two tier system. In London, some Metropolitan 
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areas (although not necessarily all) and some larger conurbations in the former Shire 
counties (regions in Scotland) where new PTAs/PTEs might usefully be established, 
quality contracts might be the norm.  In the rest of the country, the industry would remain 
broadly deregulated but with greater emphasis on the promotion of quality  partnerships.   
For rail, the key issue probably relates to investment in the infrastructure.  The influence 
that the Office of the Rail Regulator and the Strategic Rail Authority can exert on 
Railtrack is going to be important here. 
An important question is should other countries follow the UK (or more strictly British) 
reforms in public transport?  In terms of an exact carbon copy, the answer has to be no.  
Appropriate regulatory and ownership structures are likely to be place and time specific.  
Moreover, certain aspects of  the reforms (particularly with respect to the privatisations) 
were done in a hurry and could have been done better with hindsight. However, it seems 
possible that bus deregulation outside London was an improvement on the previous 
regulated regime and that rail privatisation has been an improvement on the former 
publicly owned regime.  But are these the relevant comparators?  In the bus industry, 
comprehensive tendering in London seems to have been more beneficial  than 
deregulation outside London, although the London regime is not without its faults  and 
should not be followed slavishly.  For rail, vertically integrated concessions might have 
provided a better alternative, although other than the anomalous case of the Island line, 
we would have to seek empirical evidence on this from abroad. Alternatively, a regime in 
which subsidy went primarily to the infrastructure authority rather than the train 
operators might have some policy advantages.  One advantage of the reforms has  been 
that they have helped us get a better idea of the ‘true’ economics of  public transport, 
particularly with respect to costs and innovation.  However, I am not a reluctant Austrian 
extolling the virtues of ‘creative destruction’.  The transitional costs of such destruction 
may be high and not as temporary as many people think. But we do have a better idea of 
what might be the optimal regulatory and ownership structures in public transport 
industries than we did 20 years ago.  UK based transport academics have benefited from 
such bold experiments occurring on their doorstep.  If the appropriate lessons are learnt, 
the rest of the world may benefit too.    
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Table 1: Trends in the Local Bus Market 1950 to 1996/7 (1997/8 in brackets) 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989/90 1996/7 
Local Bus 
Passenger 
Journeys 
(m) 
12,734 12,166  8,643  6,216  5,068  4,350 
(4,332)
Local Bus 
Vehicle 
Kilometres 
(m) (1) 
 3,390 3,163  2,623  2,268  2,442 2,693 
All PT 
Passenger 
Journeys 
(m) (1) 
16,445 13,313  8,687  6,224  5,074  4,355 
(4,337)
All PT 
Passenger 
Kilometres 
(b)  (2) 
  92 (3)  79   60  52  47  40 
Market 
Share (%) 
  42 (3)  28  15  11   7   6 
All PT 
Vehicle 
Kilometres 
(m) (2) 
3,967 3,795 3,463 3,280 3,835 4,199 
PT = Public Transport 
(1) Includes trams and trolley buses 
(2) Includes trams, trolleys buses and non local buses 
(3) 1952 data 
Sources: DETR 1997, 1998b, 1999a. 
Table 2.  Market Performance - %  change 1985/6 to 1997/8 (1993/4 in brackets) 
 Real cost 
per bus km 
*
Real 
subsidies 
Bus km Real fares Pass. 
Journeys 
Cost/pass. 
Journey 
*
Great Britain  
Excl. London 
-47
(-41)
-41
(-35)
+36 
(+24) 
+27 
(+17) 
-32
(-27)
-3
(+2)
London -46 
(-36)
-68
(-47)
+33 
(+26) 
+38 
(+29) 
+12 
(-3)
-33
(-23)
Sources: DETR,  1997, 1999a. 
* Includes depreciation. 
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Table 3.  Welfare Effects (£m, 1987/8 prices) compared to 1985/6 
             Great Britain Outside London              London  
                   Including   Excluding 
                                         subsidy     subsidy 
                reductions             reductions 
 1987/8 1993/4 1987/8 1993/4 1987/8 1993/4 
Producers +37 +128 +152 +334 -19 -1 
Other sectors of 
the economy 
-114 -144 -114 -144 -31 -33 
Government +115 +256 0 0 +80 +104 
Consumers -204 -294 -31 -46 +54 +135 
TOTAL -166 -104 +7 +144 +84 +205 
% charge in 
total surplus 
-6.1 -3.8 +0.2 +5.3 +11.2 +27.0 
Source: Mackie and Preston, 1996. 
Table 4: Changes in Market Share by Turnover in the British Bus Industry Since 
1989 (%) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
First Group  3.7   5.5   6.3   6.2   6.8  12.8  12.8  19.8  21.6 
Stagecoach  3.9   3.7   4.9   4.9   6.9  13.4  13.4  16.1  16.0 
Arriva  3.4   4.1   4.0   4.0   4.5  11.4  13.2  14.9  14.8 
Big Three 11.0  13.3  15.2  15.1  18.2  37.6  39.4  50.8  52.5 
Go-Ahead   1.7   1.7   1.7   1.7   1.7   4.3   4.3   6.2   6.4 
Nat. Express   0.0   0.0   6.0   5.9   5.9   7.7   7.7   5.2   5.9 
Big Five  12.7 15.0  22.9  22.7  25.8  49.6  51.4  62.2  65.8 
Small Groups    8.1   8.9    9.1   9.2   7.1   5.5   4.3   2.6   2.7 
ESOPs/MBOs  15.5 18.3  21.0  21.0  28.7  23.0 22.1  13.8  11.1 
Independents  12.0 12.2  12.9  13.9  14.1  14.6 14.6  14.2  14.6 
Public  51.6 45.8  34.2  33.3  24.4    7.5   7.5    7.2   6.8 
Source: Transport Advisory Service, 1997. 
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Table 5: Trends in the National Passenger Rail Industry Since Privatisation 
 1993/4 1998/9 % change 
Passenger km (b) 30.4 35.1 +15.5 
Passengers (m) 740 890 +20.3 
Revenue  
(£m, 1997/8 prices) 
2414 3028 +25.4 
Receipts per 
passenger km (p) 
7.9 8.6  +8.9 
Punctuality 
(% on time) 
89.6 91.6  +2.2 
Reliability 
(% operated) 
98.7 98.8  +1.0 
Mean trip length 
(km) 
41.1 39.4  -4.1 
Source: DETR, 1999b. 
Table 6: Forecasts of  Passenger Transport Volumes in Great Britain 
Billion Passenger Kms (Market Share in Percent in Brackets) 
 Base 
1996/7 
Do nothing 
2020 
Do something 
2020 
Bus  40  (6)  24  (3)  91  (9) 
National Rail  32  (5)  37  (4)  76  (8) 
Local Rail   6   (1)    7  (1)  15  (2) 
Cars, vans and taxis 619 (89) 837 (92) 781 (81) 
TOTAL 697 905 963 
Based on data from: DETR, 1997, 1998b, 1999b. 
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Figure 1: The Regulatory  and Ownership Cycles in the British Local Bus Industry
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